Chaim Bloom and Cascading Failures
Every bad decision deserves a few more.
As I’m writing this, it’s been roughly a week since Chaim Bloom has been fired from his position as Chief Baseball Officer of the Boston Red Sox, which is a title that feels less like a real job, and more a position a sports-obsessed 10-year-old appoints themselves. It’s been a long four years over-analyzing every move he’s made to finally reach the conclusion that he may just not be good at doing whatever it is a Chief Baseball Officer does. John Henry made that calculus, and thought it prudent to not add any more variables into the Bloom problem.
I will not lie to you, dear reader: I audibly yelped when the news came over the social media feeds that he was gone. Some may consider that heartless, but seeing as I’m mostly here to review his work and not his person, it feels more like a fog has been lifted. I won’t go as far with the meteorology metaphors and say a new day is dawning, but Bloom’s dismissal may finally push the Red Sox into a long-term strategy that actually includes developing and retaining a player core. Seven days into the post-Bloom era is far too early to make assumptions, but considering the missteps taken to reach this point, it might’ve moved ownership to finally go in a different direction.
In engineering parlance, a cascading failure is when a complex system collapses due to one or more parts failing and placing more strain on the remaining parts in the system, thus causing those parts to fail, and even more strain hitting the last remaining cogs, rendering them inert as well. The positive feedback loop of system strain starts slowly, but when the end comes, it’s loud, conspicuous, and fast. Cascading failures aren’t limited to aspects of engineering such as dam integrity or actual stress tests. There’s even a theory regarding The Bronze Age Collapse in the 1200s BCE, where historians argue that the disappearance of nearly every major nation in the eastern Mediterranean Sea was due to a breakdown of their complex, interconnected systems.
How does this relate to baseball, or more specifically, the team building aspect? First we have to identify a common system most teams employ. Good teams and up-and-coming squads have a core they rely on, and then surround it with complementary players. For example, the Atlanta Braves’ core consists of their studs, such as Robert Acuña Jr., Matt Olson, Spencer Strider, etc. They then complemented them with players like Eddie Rosario, who can’t field all that well anymore, but he can still smack the hell out of the ball. Charlie Morton was also brought aboard, and despite him being old enough to have witnessed that Bronze Age Collapse, is still an effective pitcher. All this comes together to make the 2023 Atlanta Braves into a runaway train.
Not too long ago, that train used to have a red B on it. The 2018 Red Sox were the best team in franchise history, racking up 108 wins in the regular season, and smoking two 100-win teams in the playoffs en route to a World Series title. Led by AL MVP Mookie Betts, Xander Bogaerts, J.D. Martinez, and an adorably precocious Rafael Devers, the Red Sox ran riot over the league. But you know this story.
They went off the rails in 2019. Devers broke out, the core four still hit well, but Brock Holt missed half the season, Andrew Benintendi stagnated, and the bottom fell out on Jackie Bradley Jr. Eduardo Rodriguez was the only starter who compiled over 100 innings and had an ERA under 4, while Chris Sale would miss the last six weeks of the season due to dreaded left elbow inflammation. Brandon Workman’s incredible 1.88 ERA out of the bullpen (he allowed just one home run in 71.2 innings!) was fantastic, but no other reliever looked reliable. Despite missing the playoffs and the horrifying state of their pitchers, they still won 84 games. Betts, Bogaerts, Devers, and J.D. Martinez were still good and, most importantly, still around. The system still functioned thanks to the core in place, even if it took a few dings on the periphery.
On September 9th, 2019, the Red Sox fired their President of Baseball Operations, Dave Dombrowski. Dombrowski’s style makes him someone I like to call a “wartime consigliere” - he’ll spend your money, he’ll trade some prospects, and he’ll put your team in good position to win the last game of the season, which the 2018 squad did. But with the current generation of prospects having graduated or been traded, and the Red Sox running the highest payroll in the league that year at just over $228 million pre-tax, Henry saw fit to show him the door.
Two months later, Henry found his hatchet man: Chaim Bloom, hired from the Tampa Bay Rays to be the team’s Chief Baseball Officer. A lot of press was focused on how Bloom would aim to 1. get under the Luxury Tax threshold and 2. restock the farm system. Those objectives were - and still are! - gilded in nature. Nevertheless, Bloom set out to correct these two problems.
The first step was getting under the Tax line, which the Red Sox had paid a royal sum of roughly $15 million for their 2019 payroll. Bloom’s solution, most likely with generous encouragement from ownership, was to trade Mookie Betts and David Price to the Los Angeles Dodgers for Alex Verdugo, Jeter Downs, and Connor Wong. Some sources say Betts was offered a 10-year, $300 million contract, something he denies, and even if that were true, it would’ve been far below his actual value. Either way, it was clear the Red Sox were not keen on negotiating further, if at all, and felt content to deal away the best player the the franchise has seen since Carl Yastrzemski in a salary dump.
As far as affecting the system goes, Bloom had just removed the central cog. The reasoning on him getting a pass on this is because this was likely initiated by ownership, but Bloom presumably took the job knowing he’d have to do something like this. The results look even worse. Betts is on an inside track to be in the Hall of Fame, and the three players they got in return… aren’t. Verdugo is a playable if uninspiring outfielder, Jeter Downs is a National now, and Connor Wong is decent, but his defense behind the dish leaves a lot to be desired. The most reliable piece of the core has been removed, and the replacement parts aren’t and won’t be up to the task.
2020, as we remember it, was decidedly not fun. COVID hits. The season is postponed indefinitely. That dreaded left elbow inflammation Chris Sale had turns into him needing Tommy John surgery, and he goes under the knife on March 30th. The 2020 season officially starts on July 23rd, playing only 60 games. Despite the playoff field being expanded to 16 teams, the Red Sox win a mere 24 contests, and finish last in the division. Things can’t possibly get more miserab-- oh hey is that Mookie Betts leading the Los Angeles Dodgers to their first World Series win in over 30 years? Imagine trading that guy.
The system stress begins its work.
Bloom adds some more complementary players in the offseason. Kiké Hernandez comes over in free agency, Nick Pivetta is acquired in a trade with Philly, and Garrett Whitlock is nabbed in the Rule 5 draft from the Yankees. Chris Sale is projected to come back later in the season. Look, this all feels a little underwhelming on the surface, but… wait, that 4.0 fWAR next to center fielder Kiké Hernandez’s name can’t be right. Garrett Whitlock was a lockdown fireman reliever? Sale looked like vintage Sale? Nick Pivetta, he of the 4.95 career ERA, did this?!?
The Red Sox knock off yet another 100-win team in the playoffs, this one being Bloom’s former employer, the Tampa Bay Rays. While they don’t overcome the Houston Astros in the ALCS, there’s actual optimism in the air. The organization didn’t part with very much money or prospects on this run, so it’s assumed that the Red Sox are back in contention.
The stress eases up, and most of the core is still intact. Maybe the system can hold together. Please ignore the gears creaking a little, they’re just happy to get back to work.
The good vibes don’t last long. The owners initiate a lockout on December 21st that lasts until March 10th, which leads a lot of people to correctly call out owners for their greed. Once the offseason resumes, the Red Sox eventually sign Trevor Story to a six-year, $140 million contract on March 23rd, which gives him roughly two weeks to be in top shape for the season. In early April, Xander Bogaerts turns down a far-below-market four-year, $90 million extension, all but guaranteeing he’ll hit free agency at the end of the season. Story struggles out of the gate, and ends up playing only 94 games due to injuries. Bogaerts goes on to be an All-Star for the fourth time in his career.
By August 2nd, the Red Sox are 53-52. In a surprise twist, they do not trade Bogaerts, but do a lot of odd, small trades that seemingly go against a stated goal: get under the Luxury Tax threshold. Bloom acquires Tommy Pham, Reese McGuire, and Eric Hosmer to complete a perplexing trade deadline, and these new additions lead the Red Sox to a middling 78-84 record all while failing to reset any of those despised Tax penalties they wanted to avoid so much.
The stress comes back with a lot more force.
The offseason is, for lack of a more descriptive word, horrifying. Since the deadline, Bloom has operated under the idea that a deal can be worked out with Bogaerts once free agency begins in late 2022. He offers the shortstop a six-year, $160 million deal. On December 8th, the Boston Globe’s Julian McWilliams spots Bloom looking pitifully shell-shocked in the airport, as news breaks that Bogaerts has accepted the San Diego Padres’ 11-year, $280 million godfather offer. The news worsens as the winter continues. Eovaldi joins the Rangers. J.D. Martinez goes to the Dodgers. The last player of the old core is Devers, and the Red Sox agree to a borderline compulsory 10-year, $313 million deal with him in January. Surely the front office will explain themselves at Winter Weekend, right?
Boy, that system is practically groaning under the pressure now.
To his credit, Bloom tried to restore order. He added Masataka Yoshida in November, a good hitter but a poor fielder. Kenley Jansen & Chris Martin become valuable bullpen pieces. But when news drops on January 10th about Trevor Story needing an elbow procedure, whatever upward momentum there was immediately reverses. The team doesn’t have the depth to weather this loss, nor does it have the elite players to potentially overcome it anymore. Betts and Bogaerts are long gone, and the rookies can’t be expected to generate the production needed.
The 2023 Red Sox are, despite themselves, fine for a while. Despite glaring deficiencies and near-constant injuries in their pitching staff, the offense props the team up and they get to the trade deadline at 56-50. They’re two games back of a playoff spot and Bloom… stays pat. He does not acquire a single major league player, and, no, Luis Urias doesn’t count. If every misstep being amplified since Winter Weekend wasn’t enough, the purposeful mediocrity is on full display after a dismal deadline. Whatever magic there was wears off, and the team staggers to a 73-72 record by September 12th. The Red Sox are likely to finish in last place in the division for the third time in the last four seasons.
The cascade failure is in full effect. The system disintegrates. The fans are loud, the deadlines conspicuous, and the end is coming fast.
Chaim Bloom is fired on September 14th.
The rubble doesn’t leave much to sort through. In the wake of Bloom’s departure, the Red Sox are currently a team with a few too many DHs, a glaring lack of quality starting pitching, and a bunch of outfielders that are pretty good, but ones you won’t miss if one of them, like Alex Verdugo, is sent to a gulag in Anaheim. It’s not a terribly fun team to watch. The youth movement is good, but Triston Casas and Jarren Duran are out for the year, and Ceddanne Rafaela is talented, but not so much skilled just yet. They’re mostly set on fading into the sunset this season while getting pantsed by any team with realistic playoff aspirations. They can’t really do much else.
The probable main reason Bloom was fired wasn’t because he made a bad team, or that he didn’t do everything the owners wanted. Bryan Joiner made the case on Monsters of Sox that he was axed because he publicly embarrassed the owners for two years. I’ll go one step further: Bloom was shown the door because he made the Red Sox irrelevant in their own city. We’re coming up on 19 years since The Idiots did the impossible, and five years since the best team this franchise has ever fielded won it all. But the Red Sox now sit solidly in fourth place behind the Celtics, Patriots, and Bruins in that order. They just have the good fortune to be playing the one sport that fills in those summer months.
The Red Sox, even with all their shortcomings, haven’t bottomed out. They ran out some bad teams, but they never went into a rebuild. The farm system has been restocked, and Marcelo Mayer, Roman Anthony, and Miguel Bleis are on their way. If the Red Sox ever get back into the business of adding some high-end players, they could be a real force very soon, with the quality depth to back it up. The system is broken, but it doesn’t have to be for long. Picking up the pieces doesn’t have to be a drawn-out process with the resources they have, but we also need to see a willingness to use said resources.
There’s not one main lesson to be learned here. Simply not doing dumb stuff is a takeaway, sure, but a failure of this magnitude probably has more to teach than just “don’t be greedy” and “trading Mookie Betts is catastrophically stupid”. It’s easy being an armchair GM, I get it. We’re not privy to the information or the directives given to the front office. But eventually the system will be remade and reshaped, and by that time, we can only hope that the organization sees that keeping it together is a much better decision than breaking it down again.